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NOTES
THE MIGRATORY BIRD RULE AFTER LOPEZ:
QUESTIONING THE VALUE OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY
IN THE CONTEXT OF WETLAND REGULATION
Before a land owner may lawfully undertake development that
could result in wetland destruction, even if the affected wetland is
wholly within the limits of his estate, he must first obtain a per-
mit from the Army Corps of Engineers.' This federally operated
permit program is a product of section 404 of the Clean Water
Act.2 The Clean Water Act authorizes federal jurisdiction over all
"navigable waters."' By defining navigable waters broadly, Con-
gress contemplated federal jurisdiction over wetlands to operate
to the full extent of the Commerce Clause.4 In crafting regula-
tions for the enforcement of section 404, the EPA adopted what is
known as the "migratory bird rule" (MBR). The MBR extends the
Army Corps's section 404 jurisdiction to wetlands "whose use by
and value to migratory birds is well established."5
This Note explores the constitutional validity6 of the MBR as
1. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816
(1972) (codified as amended by the Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat.
1566 (1977), at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
2. See id.
3. See Sam Kalen, Commerce To Conservation: The Call For a National Water
Policy and the Evolution of Federal Jurisdiction Over Wetlands, 69 N.D. L. REV. 873,
887 (1993); Richard G. Kozlowki & Howard Bleichfeld, Wetlands Enforcement: Lion
or Lamb?, RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1996, at 62, 63.
4. See Kalen, supra note 3, at 898 (asserting that the 1977 congressional amend-
ments make evident that Congress accepted the Corps's regulations, which defined
jurisdiction to the extent of the Commerce Clause).
5. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (1986); see J. Blanding Holman, IV, Note, After
United States v. Lopez: Can The Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act
Survive Commerce Clause Attack?, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 139, 167 (citing EPA memo-
randum from Francis S. Blake, General Counsel, to Richard E. Samderson, Acting
Assistant Administrator, Office of External Affairs (Sept. 12, 1985)).
6. In determining "constitutional validity," this Note asks whether a reviewing
court ought to uphold the MBR as an act of commerce power.
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one method to determine whether a wetland comes under feder-
al commerce power jurisdiction. Commerce power jurisdiction is
a prerequisite to federal regulation of any isolated wetland pur-
suant to section 404 of the Clean Water Act.7 In the wake of the
United States v. Lopez' decision, which explicitly recognized a
limit to federal commerce power, many scholars examined con-
gressional extensions of commerce power with renewed inter-
est.9 In Leslie Salt v. United States'0 a landowner challenged
the MBR's extension of congressional commerce power. By the
time the challenger petitioned for certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court already had issued the Lopez decision. The
Court denied certiorari, but Justice Thomas dissented, question-
ing the MBR's validity in view of the Lopez decision." Several
authors have shared his concern.12
7. See Kalen, supra note 3, at 896 (explaining the Army Corps's regulations in-
terpreting jurisdiction over isolated wetlands and water bodies, intermittent streams,
and other waters not connected to interstate or navigable waters); John A. Leman,
Comment, The Birds: Regulation of Isolated Wetlands and The Limits of the Com-
merce Clause, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1237, 1255 (1995) (noting that "[glenerally, fed-
eral courts of appeal have found that Congress intended the Clean Water Act to
extend to the limits of the Commerce Clause").
8. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
9. See Mark A. Chertok, Federal Regulation of Wetlands, in ENVIRONMENTAL LITI-
GATION, 1133, 1137 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, June 24, 1996) available in Westlaw
SA85/3 ALI-ABA 1133; Stephen M. Johnson, United States v. Lopez: A Misstep, But
Hardly Epochal for Federal Environmental Regulation, 5 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 33
(1996); Stephen M. McJohn, The Impact of the United States v. Lopez: The New
Hybrid Commerce Clause, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1995); Edward Alburo Morrissey, The
Jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act Over Isolated Wetlands: The Migratory Bird Rule,
22 J. LEGIS. 137, 141-44 (1996); Michael Bablo, Note, Leslie Salt Co. v. United
States: Does the Recent Supreme Court Decision in United States v. Lopez Dictate
the Abrogation of the 'Migratory Bird Rule"?, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 277
(1995); Eric Grossman, Comment, Where Do We Go From Here? The Aftermath and
Application of United States v. Lopez, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 795 (1996); Jonathan G.
Hieneman, Note & Comment, The Shrinking Reach of the Commerce Power: Is
Wetland Jurisdiction in Danger?, 10 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 341, 353-56
(1995); Holman, supra note 5; Leman, supra note 7, at 1253-67 (noting that the
Fifth Circuit's holding in Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), represents a limitation
of commerce power potentially relevant to the Clean Water Act).
10. 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Cargill v. United States,
516 U.S. 955 (1995).
11. See Cargill, 516 U.S. at 955 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Due to the procedural
complexity of the Leslie Salt line of cases, arguably, the Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari based on issues other than the merits. See infra notes 61-96 and accompany-
ing text.
12. See, e.g., Morrissey, supra note 9, at 141-43; Bablo, supra note 9, at 289-92;
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This Note concludes that the MBR survives the Lopez test and
that the denial of certiorari to Leslie Salt can be reconciled with
the Lopez decision. Other notes and articles have scrutinized the
strength of the MBR's interstate commerce nexus. 3 A careful
reading of Lopez, however, suggests that its application to the
MBR should focus not exclusively on the strength of the inter-
state commerce nexus, an essentially formalistic test,'4 but also
on the broad implications to the federal-state balance in sustain-
ing the rule as constitutional expression of commerce power-a
functionalist or pragmatic test. The Lopez test introduces a nov-
el, albeit intuitive, criterion for assessing the constitutionality of
federal regulation based on the commerce power. By scrutinizing
the impact of a federal regulation on the constitutionally con-
templated federal-state balance, Lopez invites a broad inquiry
into the relative merits of permitting federal regulation in favor
of state regulation in a given arena. In effect, this permits the
obvious and welcome inquiry into whether federal regulation in
a particular area is more or less consistent with the organizing
principles behind the structure of the government. Because the
Framers deliberately designed the federal-state balance with a
specific purpose in mind, it seems fair to assert that the
Framers' federal-state sovereignty distinction warrants exten-
Hohnan, supra note 5, at 198-99; Leman, supra note 7, at 1259-61.
13. See Morrissey, supra note 9, at 141-43; Bablo, supra note 9, at 289-92;
Holman, supra, note 5, at 198-99; Leman, supra note 7, at 1259-61. These inquiries
focused on whether the activity in question, i.e., destroying a wetland that is a habi-
tat to migratory birds, substantially affects interstate commerce.
14. For a history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, see United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 551-60 (reciting the history of the Commerce Clause); Grossman, supra
note 9, at 815-32; Robert Wax, Comment, United States v. Lopez: The Continued
Ambiguity of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 275, 277-84 (1996).
The interstate commerce nexus is, or was, a formalistic test inquiring whether a reg-
ulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559
(citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968)); see also Alan R. Arkin,
Comment, Inconsistencies in Modern Federalism Jurisprudence, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1569,
1579 (1996) (noting the acceptance of the "substantial economic effect" approach to
commerce power jurisdiction after NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937) and Wickard u. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)). Over time the test, while
maintaining formalistic language, became more open ended, departing from the for-
malistic test and becoming effectively all-inclusive. See Arkin, supra, at 1582 (noting
that the Commerce Clause has "been expanded into an amorphous legislative tool
with few limits").
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sion only insofar as it furthers their contemplated purpose.
A broad inquiry into the MBR in the context of the Framers'
contemplated federal-state balance produces two conclusions.
First, the federal rather than state government is better situat-
ed to protect the economic interests in the nation's wetlands.
Development and destruction of wetlands results in a market
failure that demands a regulatory solution. 5 Because this mar-
ket failure stems from interstate economic externalities, correc-
tive regulations are best fashioned and administered on a feder-
al level. Second, the reasons that justify the presumption of
state regulation of most matters do not support state regulation
of isolated wetlands. The MBR may represent an accession to
power by the federal government at the states' expense, but it
does not upset the guiding principles behind the constitutionally
contemplated federal-state balance.
The first section of this Note traces the development of the
MBR as one of several tests applied to define the limits of Com-
merce Clause jurisdiction over regulation of isolated wetlands.
The second section describes and analyzes the Lopez decision in
the context of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The Note then
applies the Lopez test to the MBR and concludes that the MBR
would survive the Lopez test. The Note arrives at this conclusion
by applying the more traditional aspects of the Lopez test as
well as the less traditional, more functionalist aspects of the
Lopez test. Pursuant to the functional-federalism inquiry, this
section also examines the impact of sustaining the MBR as a
valid expression of congressional commerce power on the feder-
al-state balance of power. The Note argues that state, not feder-
al, regulation frustrates efficient and representationally fair
wetland regulation. The Framers did not decide arbitrarily to
reserve to the states the vast majority of regulatory power. The
Framers recognized that certain benefits would flow from state
sovereignty. 6 These "benefits," however, are absent in the con-
text of wetland regulation. This Note concludes that whatever
its merit, the presumption of state sovereignty should extend
only so far as the reasons that justify its existence. The Note
15. See infra notes 268-76 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 280-92 and accompanying text.
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asserts in conclusion that Lopez, properly understood, should not
threaten federal regulations designed to correct market failures
involving significant interstate externalities.
SECTION 404 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE MIGRATORY
BIRD RULE
In the last thirty years, society's perception of wetlands, in-
cluding swamps, bogs, marshes, prairie potholes, and similar
areas, has changed. Once considered valueless obstacles to eco-
nomic development,'7 wetlands are now recognized to perform
valuable and irreplaceable functions. 8 The recognized ecologi-
cal functions provided by wetlands include floodpeak reduction,
shoreline erosion control, water quality control, and provision of
fish and wildlife habitat.'9 In addition to recognizing ecological
contributions of wetlands, society recognizes, intrinsic,0 aes-
thetic,2 1 and recreational 22 values in wetland preservation.
The nation's rapid growth came at the expense of the Ameri-
can wetland. In the continental United States, of 221 million
acres of wetland, only 103 million remain, and 200,000 to
300,000 acres are lost yearly."
In 1972, Congress enacted the "Clean Water Act" (CWA)-
officially, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.' The CWA's
17. See Chertok, supra note 9, at 1137; Stephen M. Johnson, Federal Regulation
of Isolated Wetlands, 23 ENVTL. L. 1, 2-3 (1993). Through the Swamp Lands Act of
1849, 1850, and 1860, Congress actively encouraged the destruction of 65 million
acres of wetland in part to reduce malaria. See James K. Jackson & William A.
Nitze, Wetlands Protection Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act-The Riverside
Bayview Decision, its Past and Future, 7 PUB. LAND L. REV. 21, 22 (1986).
18. See Chertok, supra note 9, at 1137; Jackson & Nitze, supra note 17, at 22-
23.
19. See Jackson & Nitze, supra note 17, at 21, 23.
20. See id. at 23.
21. See HOLMES ROiSTON, PHILOSOPHY GONE WILD 81 (1989).
22. See id. at 78.
23. See Chertok, supra note 9, at 1137; see also Oliver A. Houck & Michael
Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of Clean
Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242,
1251 (1995) (estimating that of 215 million acres of original wetland acreage, less
than half remain, suggesting annual loss at 300,000 acres per year nationally).
24. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended by the Clean
Water Act, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977), at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
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self-stated purpose "is to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."' In
recognition of wetland value and massive wetland destruction,
Congress included in the CWA section 404, which prohibits the
discharge of dredge or fill into wetlands or other waters without
a permit. 6 The language of the CWA, however, refers not to
wetlands but rather to "navigable waters."27 The CWA defines
navigable waters as "waters of the United States." ' By defin-
ing "navigable waters" broadly, Congress intended for the regu-
lation to apply to the full extent of the Commerce Clause. 9 Be-
tween 1974 and 1986, pursuant to authority granted in the
CWA,0 the Army Corps of Engineers promulgated regulations
interpreting the scope of section 404 jurisdiction.3
The Army Corps's regulations require permits for discharges
into three types of waters: interstate waters, waters that are
adjacent to other waters of the United States, and "[aill other
waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers,... wetlands, ... or
natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which
could affect interstate or foreign commerce." 2 In 1986, in an
attempt to set section 404 guidelines for wetland jurisdiction,
the Corps adopted regulatory criteria to define wetlands subject
to federal jurisdiction by virtue of federal commerce power.3
The Corps recognized the EPA's interpretation of "waters of the
United States" that includes, inter alia, waters: "(a) Which are
or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird
Treaties; or (b) Which are or would be used as habitat by other
migratory birds which cross state lines."34 This regulation codi-
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)); see Chertok, supra note 9, at 1138.
25. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
26. See id. § 404; Johnson, supra note 17, at n.14.
27. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
28. Id. § 502(7).
29. See Kalen, supra note 3, at 898 (asserting that the 1977 congressional amend-
ments make evident that Congress accepted the Corps's regulations that defined ju-
risdiction to the extent of the Commerce Clause); Johnson, supra note 17, at 9-10.
30. See 33 U.S.C. § 1.
31. See Johnson, supra note 17, at 10-13.
32. Id. at n.53 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3a(3) (1991)).
33. See id. at 13.
34. Id. at n.55 (quoting 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (1986)).
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fled an EPA memorandum describing what has become known
as the "Migratory Bird Rule:"
[If a particular waterbody shares the characteristics of other
waters whose use by and value to migratory birds is well
established and those characteristics make it likely that the
waterbody in question will also be used by migratory birds, it
would also seem to fall clearly within the definition [of "wa-
ters of the United States"] (unless, of course, there is other
information that indicates the particular waterbody would
not in fact be so used).35
The Migratory Bird Rule, somewhat radically, expands federal
jurisdiction over wetlands by recognizing a not so intuitive nex-
us between wetlands and interstate commerce. This nexus is
based on the commercial industry surrounding wetland-depen-
dent migratory fowl. In 1980, 5.3 million Americans spent 10 bil-
lion dollars hunting migratory birds." That same year, 55 mil-
lion Americans spent nearly 10 billion dollars to watch and pho-
tograph wetland-dependent birds. 7 Migratory bird related com-
merce is dependent on the preservation of migratory birds'
wetland habitats-many of which are isolated wetlands. 8 Al-
though commerce power jurisdiction over U.S. waters in the past
has been limited to waters connected to, or at least adjacent to,
interstate waterways, the MBR is unique in that it creates an
interstate commerce nexus that includes intrastate, isolated
waters. 9 Two circuits have reviewed the substance of the
MBR.4° The Supreme Court has upheld permitting authority
35. Holman, supra note 5, at 167 (citing EPA memorandum from Francis S.
Blake, General Counsel, to Richard E. Samderson, Acting Assistant Administrator,
Office of External Affairs (Sept. 12, 1985)); see 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (1986).
36. See Houck & Rolland, supra note 23, at 1248.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
40. See Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1995);
Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993). In Tabb Lakes Ltd. v.
United States, 715 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd, 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989),
a district court held that the Corps's adoption of the MBR violated notice and com-
ment. See id. at 728. Consequently, the Corps no longer applies the MBR in the
Fourth Circuit. The Corps does not, however, give effect to the Tabb Lakes decision
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over an adjacent wetland,4 but has not reviewed the applica-
tion of section 404 to an isolated wetland.
United States v. Hoffman Homes42
In the Hoffman Homes line of cases, the Seventh Circuit
asked whether use by migratory birds provided a sufficient nex-
us with interstate commerce to render a wetland subject to fed-
eral regulation.4" In 1986, the Army Corps of Engineers investi-
gated a construction site in the Village of East Hoffman, lli-
nois." The Corps determined that Hoffman Homes, Inc. violat-
ed the CWA by filling in two wetlands, "Area A" and "Area
B."45 On November 19, 1990, the EPA's Chief Judicial Officer,
(CJO), reversing an Administrative Law Judge,46 assessed a
$100,000 fine against Hoffman. The CJO determined that po-
tential use by migratory birds created a constitutional basis for
section 404 jurisdiction. 48 The wetland in question qualified as
suitable habitat for migratory birds and therefore as "waters of
the United States."49
The court of appeals reversed the EPA's decision and struck
down the MBR.50 The court of appeals, in an opinion by Judge
Manion, held that the CJO's extension of federal jurisdiction
violated language of the CWA and the Commerce Clause."'
outside of the Fourth Circuit. See Carol E. Dinkens & Sharon M. Mattox, Regulatory
Obstacles to Development and Redevelopment: Wetlands and Other Essential Issues, in
THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ON REAL ESTATE AND OTHER COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS 731, 739-40 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Oct. 10, 1996) available in
Westlaw SB18 ALI-ABA 731.
41. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
42. 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
43. See Hoffnan Homes, 999 F.2d at 260.
44. See id. at 257-58.
45. See id. at 258-59.
46. See In re Hoffman Group, 1990 WL 657313 (EPA Nov. 19, 1990) *1, rev'd sub
nom. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 961 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1992). The ALJ found
that Area A had no relation to interstate commerce apart from potential use by mi-
gratory birds. See id. He found this an insufficient connection to interstate commerce
to justify inclusion of Area A as "Waters of the United States." See id.
47. See Hoffman Group, 1990 WL 657313 (EPA) at *1.
48. See id. at *8-*9.
49. Id.
50. See Hoffman Homes, 961 F.2d at 1321-23.
51. See id.
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Judge Manion criticized the MBR for failing to require human
activity.52 Absent actual hunting, birdwatching or photograph-
ing, Judge Manion did not agree that birds' presence, much less
their potential presence, could affect interstate commerce.53
The following year the Seventh Circuit granted an EPA peti-
tion to rehear the Hoffman case.54 The court reached the same
disposition but employed a different rationale.55 Unlike Judge
Manion in Hoffman I, Senior Circuit Judge Wood upheld the
CJO's interpretation of section 404 of the CWA.56 The court
held that potential use by migratory birds provided a sufficient
nexus with interstate commerce to justify defining a wetland as
"waters of the United States."" Although the court deferred to
the CJO's statutory interpretation, it looked to the ALJ's factual
findings.58 The ALJ concluded that "the evidence did not sup-
port the conclusion that Area A had characteristics whose use by
and value to migratory birds is well established."59 The court
concluded whimsically, by invoking the judgment of the birds
themselves, that "[h]aving avoided Area A the migratory birds
have thus spoken and submitted their own evidence. We see no
need to argue with them."0 Ultimately the Hoffman Homes line
of cases upheld the migratory bird rule, if not its application to
the wetland in question.
Leslie Salt v. United States
In the Leslie Salt line of cases, the Ninth Circuit summarily
upheld the MBR without an in-depth exploration of its
52. See id. at 1320 (stating that '[uintil they are... impacted by people who
do . . . engage in interstate commerce, migratory birds do not ignite the Commerce
Clause").
53. See id.
54. See Hoffman Homes, Inc. v..EPA, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
55. See id.
56. See id. at 261 (stating that "[w]e also agree with the CJO that it is reason-
able to interpret the regulation as allowing migratory birds to be [the] connection
between a wetland and interstate commerce").
57. Id.
58. See id. at 262 (noting that "[t]he A.J. .. was in the unique position to view
the evidence, to hear the testimony, and to judge the credibility of the witnesses").
59. Id.
60. Id. at 262.
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constitutionality.6' Leslie Salt concerned a property owned by a
salt manufacturer in Newark, California. 2 At issue on appeal
were 12.5 acres out of a 143 acre parcel that contained defunct
salt crystallizing pits and unused calcium chloride pits.' Since
1959 the pits were inactive in salt production but during winter
and spring, pooling rainwater created temporary ponds in the
pits.' Migratory birds used these ponds for habitat.' Neither
party contested that the "ponds" were isolated-they were nei-
ther connected nor adjacent to other water bodies.66 In October,
1985, Leslie Salt Company began digging a feeder ditch and a
siltation pond on these properties.67 This activity resulted in
the discharge of fill in the area subject to seasonal ponding."
In response to this activity, the Corps issued a cease and desist
order asserting jurisdiction over the "waters" in question.69
Leslie Salt f °
In Leslie Salt I, the company successfully challenged the Army
Corps's jurisdiction.7' The Corps relied on the MBR to establish
jurisdiction; however, the district court never reached the issue
of the rule's constitutionality." Instead, the district court noted
that before the interstate commerce connections could be ad-
dressed, the property had to be properly classified as "other
waters" as defined by section 328.3(a)(3) of the Code of Federal
Regulations.7" The court held that the seasonal ponding in the
61. See Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1995) (Leslie
Salt IV).
62. See Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 700 F. Supp. 476, 478 (N.D. Cal. 1988)
(Leslie Salt 1).
63. See Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1391.
64. See Leslie Salt I, 700 F. Supp. at 480.
65. See id. at 481.
66. See id. at 480.
67. See id. at 481.
68. See Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1391.
69. See Leslie Salt I, 700 F. Supp. at 481.
70. See id. at 476.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 485.
73. See id. Section 328 of the Code of Federal Regulations defines "the term 'wa-
ters of the United States' as it applies to the jurisdictional limits of the authority of
the Corps of Engineers under the Clean Water Act." 33 C.F.R. § 328.1 (1997).
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former salt pits fell outside the definition of "other waters" be-
cause the pits were artificial, "not natural" and "dry most of the
year."
74
Leslie Salt If5
In Leslie Salt II, the Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's
interpretation of the term "other waters" in 33 C.F.R. §
328.3(a)(3).76 After deciding the issue presented on appeal, i.e.
the statutory definition of "other waters," the court of appeals
noted that the lower court "failed to determine whether the
crystallizers and pits" had sufficient connection to interstate
commerce to come under the Corps's jurisdiction.77 The court
noted that the Corps had adopted the MBR and that the record
indicated the potential presence of migratory birds on the prop-
erty.7 In one sentence, the court asserted the constitutionality
of the MBR, stating that "[t]he commerce clause power, and thus
the Clean Water Act, is broad enough to extend the Corps's
jurisdiction to local waters that may provide habitat to migrato-
ry birds."7" After reversing the district court's conclusion that
the area in question fell outside the regulatory definition of
"other waters," and after summarily resolving the constitutional-
ity of the migratory bird nexus, the court of appeals remanded
the case to determine whether the property had sufficient con-
nections to interstate commerce."0
74. Id.
75. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990) (Leslie Salt 11).
76. See id at 359-60. The question presented on review was whether the statute's
definition of "other waters" included the land at issue in light of the facts that the
ponding was seasonal and the government was, in part, responsible for the wetlands
creation. See id. at 359. As explained below, however, the court spoke to the issue of
the MBR's constitutionality.
77. Id. at 360.
78. See id (stating that "Ithe record showed ... that migratory birds . . . may
have used the property as habitat").
79. Id. (citing Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 804 (10th Cir. 1984); Palila v. Hawaii
Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 991-95 (D. Haw. 1979),
affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981)). Whether the MBR is a valid exercise of com-
merce power was not a question presented on appeal to this court. The court, how-
ever, used language that seemed to uphold the MBR as constitutional but provided
no analysis of its constitutionality.
80. See id.
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Leslie Salt II 1
In Leslie Salt III, the district court found that the property at
issue was properly subject to the Corps's jurisdiction.82 The
court noted that some fifty-five species of migratory birds used
the seasonal ponds as habitat and that this fact, in conjunction
with the Ninth Circuit's instructions on remand, led to a finding
of jurisdiction.'
Leslie Salt IV'
On second appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiff "urge[d]
the court to revisit the Leslie Salt H court's determination that
the Corps' jurisdiction under the Act reaches isolated waters
used only by migratory birds."' The court, citing the law of the
case doctrine, refused to rehear "matters resolved in a prior
appeal to another panel in the same case."' The court stated
that the "validity of the 'migratory bird rule' was established in
the first appeal, and this court's review should generally be
limited to the issues decided on remand-the property's specific
connections to interstate commerce due to migratory bird
use."87 In response to the plaintiffs protestations, the court con-
ceded that the court in Leslie Salt H affirmed the rule without
analysis or explanation." The court in Leslie Salt IV noted,
however, that "even summarily treated issues become the law of
the case."89 The court examined the merits of the case only
enough to determine whether the matter should be reconsidered.
The standard of review for such an inquiry asks whether the
previous finding is "clearly wrong.""' Citing the language of the
81. 820 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (order for judgment) (Leslie Salt II).
82. See id. at 482.
83. See id. at 480; Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir.
1995) (Leslie Salt IV).
84. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995).
85. Id. at 1388.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. Id. (quoting Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131, 1135
(D.C. Cir. 1994)).
90. Id. at 1393.
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Act, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,"' and Hoffman
Homes Inc. v. EPA, 2 the court found that Leslie Salt I's deter-
mination-that the Corps's migratory bird nexus interpretation
of section 404 was reasonable-could not be construed as clearly
wrong.93 As such, the court refused to revisit the validity of the
MBR.
Leslie Salt: The Denial of Certiorari
On October 30, 1995, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to
Leslie Salt IV.94 Justice Thomas dissented to the denial of cer-
tiorari, explaining that he would have granted certiorari "to
resolve whether the potential or occasional existence of migrato-
ry birds on petitioner's property creates a sufficient nexus with
interstate commerce to permit Corps regulation of these
lands." 5 Justice Thomas questioned the MBR's legitimacy in
view of the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez. The MBR, opined
the Justice, relied on an even more attenuated connection to
interstate commerce than did the connection in Lopez-a connec-
tion deemed constitutionally impermissible.96
UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ IN CONTEXT
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
Lopez is often cited as a break with over fifty years of Com-
merce Clause precedence.9" The Commerce Clause enumerates
a federal power. Article I, section 8, of the United States Consti-
tution provides that, Congress "shall have Power... To regulate
Commerce... among the several States."98 For more than 170
years the Supreme Court has struggled to define the limits of
91. 474 U.S. 121 (1985),
92. 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
93. See Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1395.
94. See Cargill v. United States, 516 U.S. 955 (1995).
95. Id. at 956-57 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
96. See id. at 957-58 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 575 (3d Cir. 1995); Steven G.
Calabresi, 'A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers". In Defense of United
States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 752 (1995); McJohn, supra note 9, at 1.
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3.
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federal commerce power.99
In the first Supreme Court inquiry into the Commerce Clause,
Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v. Ogden,' held that the Consti-
tution vested Congress with a plenary power to regulate any
intrastate activity that affected commerce among the states.'
Justice Marshall cautioned that the word "among" required
involvement of more than one state.0 2
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Court
introduced restrictions to congressional commerce power. 3 The
Court held that certain activities, such as manufacturing, produc-
tion, and mining, fell outside the definition of commerce for the
purposes of Commerce Clause regulation.' Similarly, the
Court drew distinctions between activities whose effects on inter-
state commerce were "direct" and those that were "indirect.""5
Activities whose effects were indirect, the Supreme Court held,
could not be regulated under commerce power. 6
With its decision in NLRB v. Jones,' the Court initiated a
trend toward relaxing its more formalistic application of the
Commerce Clause.' 8 The court held that legislation that acted
to prevent labor strikes was within the commerce power because
even intrastate strikes had interstate consequences.0 9 This
trend reached its peak in the 1942 case of Wickard v.
Filburn."° Under the Court's analysis in Wickard, wheat
grown for home consumption was an activity that, in the aggre-
gate, affected interstate commerce by influencing national wheat
99. For a concise history of the Commerce Clause, see Stephen R. McAllister, Is
There a Judicially Enforceable Limit To Congressional Power Under the Commerce
Clause?, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 217, 220-25 (1996).
100. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
101. See id. at 193-97.
102. See McAllister, supra note 99, at 223.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id. (citing A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,
550 (1935)).
106. See id.
107. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
108. See id at 34-41; McAllister, supra note 99, at 223.
109. See McAllister, supra note 99, at 223.
110. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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prices."' The Court found Congress's commerce power suffi-
cient to regulate wheat produced for personal consumption."
A liberal interpretation of commerce power led the Court to
apply the commerce power to effect social policy."' For exam-
ple, the Court justified Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964," as applied to hotels, motels, and restaurants, as a val-
id exercise of federal commerce power."'
The expansion of federal commerce power permitted legisla-
tion criminalizing caijacking, domestic violence, arson, failure to
pay child support, and the liberation of research animals."6
Also, under the guise of the Commerce Clause, Congress enacted
regulatory programs including the Endangered Species Act
(ESA) and the Clean Water Act." 7
Under the New Deal conception, the commerce power covered
three categories: "regulating the use of channels of interstate
commerce; protecting goods or people in commerce and the in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce; and regulating activities
affecting commerce.""' The Commerce Clause cases of the New
Deal era advanced a broad interpretation of the commerce pow-
er."' Many cases contained dicta suggesting some limitation
on the federal commerce power,2 ° but none of these cases ex-
pressly limited commerce power.2' Consequently, when Lopez
held that Congress's enactment of a federal criminal statute
exceeded the commerce power, it captured the attention of con-
stitutional law scholars.'22
111. See id. at 112.
112. See id. at 130-31.
113. See McAllister, supra note 99, at 224.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
115. See Katzenbach v. McLung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). The Court endorsed this ap-
plication of the commerce power, stating that these restaurants and hotels served
food products that moved in interstate commerce. See id. at 304.
116. See McAllister, supra note 99, at 225.
117. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 67-82 (discussing congressional authority for the
CWA and the ESA).
118. McJohn, supra note 9, at 10.
119. See id. at 13.
120. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 555-58 (1995).
121. See McJohn, supra note 9, at 13.
122. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Con-
stitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 695
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Federalism Jurisprudence: The Tenth Amendment
Commerce Clause jurisprudence should be viewed in the con-
text of the Tenth Amendment.' The Tenth Amendment re-
serves to the states all powers not expressly delegated to the
federal government in the Constitution." The language of the
Tenth Amendment, as supported by the structure of the Consti-
tution and the comments of the Framers, contemplates that the
federal government's powers be few and individually enumerat-
ed and that the states retain more generalized powers governing
the day to day affairs of the people and their property."
In recent history, the Supreme Court has wrestled with oppos-
ing views of the Tenth Amendment. Under one view, the Tenth
Amendment is a judicially enforceable substantive limit on fed-
eral power.' Under the other view, the Tenth Amendment is
a procedural limit on federal power to be structurally enforced
by the political process rather than the courts. 2'
In National League of Cities v. Usery,"25 the Court imposed a
substantive limit on federal commerce power holding that Con-
gress could not exercise its power in a manner that interfered
with "traditional state functions."'29 The Court held that feder-
al regulation that intruded upon areas of traditional state gov-
(1996); Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and
Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554 (1995); Mark
Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment?: Lopez and Constitutional Theory, 46
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 845 (1996).
123. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
124. See id. ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
125. See Russell F. Pannier, Lopez and Federalism, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 71,
81 (1996) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison)).
126. See Arkin, supra note 14, at 1583-86 (discussing National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992)); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577-78 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting that the Court has, in the past "participated in maintaining the
federal balance," and asserting that it is within its role to continue to do so).
127. See Arkin, supra note 14, at 1586 (citing Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528, and noting
that it "transformed the Tenth Amendment from a judicial doctrine into a political
doctrine").
128. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
129. See id. at 852.
MIGRATORY BIRD RULE AFTER LOPEZ
ernmental functions, "devoure[d] the essentials of state sover-
eignty" by upsetting the constitutionally intended federal-state
balance of power. 3 '
Ten years later, in 1985, the Court overruled National
League of Cities with Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.3' Noting the difficulty in defining tradi-
tional state government functions, the Court asserted that the
political process best enforced the Tenth Amendment.'32 As
support for its holding, the majority noted that the Framers
intended the structure of the government to provide procedural
restraints on federal power.' Although these two views rep-
resent contrasting approaches, the Court's opinions reflect an
unwillingness to select one to the exclusion of the other.34
Without overruling Garcia, the Court has engaged in judicial
enforcement Tenth Amendment as a substantive restraint on
federal power. In Gregory v. Ashcroft,"5 the Court imposed a
requirement that when legislation intrudes on an area of tra-
ditional state concern, Congress must plainly state its inten-
tion to do so.' For the Court to enforce such a requirement
it must necessarily engage in the forbidden and supposedly
"impossible" activity of distinguishing traditional from nontra-
ditional state government functions.3 ' Finally in New York v.
United States,3 ' the Court once again defined boundaries be-
tween federal and state power.'39 Without actually overruling
Garcia, the Court appeared to return to a model of federalism
130. Id. at 855 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 205 (1968) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
131. 469 U.S. 528, 531, 557 (1985).
132. See id. at 556.
133. See id. at 552 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison)).
134. See McJohn, supra note 9, at 1 n.3; Arkin, supra note 14, at 1589.
135. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
136. See id. at 464 (noting the constraint Garcia placed on judicial enforcement of
federal-state balance, but asserting that the "plain statement" requirement is consis-
tent with that constraint).
137. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 539-47 (noting that the distinction between traditional
and nontraditional state functions is unworkable).
138. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
139. See id. at 157 (noting that [t]he Tenth Amendment thus directs [the Court] to
determine . .. whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation
on an Article I power").
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that contemplated judicial enforcement. The Lopez decision
continues this tradition of ambiguity.
Lopez Facts
On March 10, 1992, respondent Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-
grade student, carried a concealed weapon into his high
school. "' The government charged Lopez with violating the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which prohibits "any indi-
vidual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he]
knows ... is a school zone."' The district court held that sec-
tion 922(q) was a constitutional exercise of federal commerce
power.12 The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 fell outside the constitutional
grant of federal commerce power."' The Supreme Court af-
firmed.' Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
court in which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
joined.45 Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion in which
Justice O'Connor joined. " 6
Majority Opinion
In reciting the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
Justice Rehnquist noted that even the "modern-era precedents
which have expanded congressional power under the Commerce
Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer limits.""'
The Court recognized three categories of activity subject to com-
merce power regulation: "the channels of interstate commerce";
the "instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
140. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
141. Id. at 549 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1988)).
142. See id. at 551-52.
143. See id. at 552.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 551-68.
146. See id. at 568-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In addition, Justice Thomas filed a
concurring opinion, id. at 584-602 (Thomas, J., concurring), and Justices Stevens, id.
at 602-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Souter, id. at 603-15 (Souter, J., dissenting);
Breyer, id. at 615-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting); and Ginsburg, id. at 615-31 (Ginsburg
J., dissenting), dissented.
147. Id. at 556-57.
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things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come
from intrastate activity;" and "activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce."' The Court concluded that it
could sustain section 922(q) only as regulation of the third
type-activities that substantially affect interstate com-
merce. 49 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that case law es-
tablished a clear pattern suggesting that "[wihere economic
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation
regulating that activity will be sustained."5 ' Chief Justice
Rehnquist continued by finding that section 922(q) "by its terms
has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enter-
prise, however broadly one might define those terms."'' Be-
cause he construed Wickard's5 2 aggregate principle to require
an activity "that arise[s] out of or [is] connected with a commer-
cial transaction," Chief Justice Rehnquist determined that sec-
tion 922(q) could not benefit from a "Wickard type" analysis.'
Further the Court noted that the statute contained no juris-
dictional hook." The statute included no requirement that the
government examine each instance of firearm possession on a
case-by-case basis to determine whether it actually affected
interstate commerce prior to applying the statute.'55 The Court
noted that the statute was unaccompanied by any legislative
findings showing the regulated activity's nexus with interstate
commerce. 56 The Court indicated that such findings were not
mandatory, but that their presence might have worked in the
government's favor.'57
The government offered several arguments asserting that
148. Id. at 558-59.
149. See id. at 559.
150. Id. at 560 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 561.
152. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
153. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. The Wickard principle permits regulation of an
activity that, in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 111. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in Lopez, limited the Wickard
analysis to activities that themselves are economic or commercial in nature. See
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61.
154. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
155. See id. at 562.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 562-63.
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possession of a gun in a school zone could substantially affect
interstate commerce.' Chief Justice Rehnquist, instead of at-
tacking the logic of the offered nexus, considered the logical
consequences of the government's arguments."5 9 He opined that
"if we were to accept the Government's arguments, we [would
be] hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Con-
gress is without power to regulate."6 ' Chief Justice Rehnquist
conceded that the ambiguous distinction between that which is
commercial, and that which is not, may result in uncertainty but
noted that "[t]he Constitution mandates this uncertainty by
withholding from Congress a plenary police power.""6 '
Chief Justice Rehnquist refused to expand commerce power
any further; however, because past cases defined the Commerce
Clause so broadly, and because Chief Justice Rehnquist refused to
reverse prior case law, the Chief Justice had to import a new
analysis into Commerce Clause jurisprudence. He did so by rec-
ognizing that affirming this statute would obliterate the bound-
aries between federal and state sovereignty, and, as such, he
implicitly imported a Tenth Amendment analysis.'62 Affirming
the statute, opined the Chief Justice, would contravene the con-
stitutionally contemplated federal-state structure. In other words,
affirming the statute would violate the Tenth Amendment."
Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, like the majority opinion,
emphasized the consequences in affirming the regula-
tion-especially the impact on federalism."M His concurring
opinion adopted a functionalist, or pragmatic approach, under
158. See id. at 563-64.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 564. For a discussion of Chief Justice Rehnquist's test of consequences,
see H. Jefferson Powell, Enumerated Means and Unlimited Ends, 94 MICH. L. REV.
651, 656-58 (1995).
161. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.
162. See id. at 566-67.
163. See id. at 567 (asserting by implication that to uphold the statute would vio-
late the Tenth Amendment; to uphold the statute 'would require [the Court] to
conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose some-
thing not enumerated").
164. See id. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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which a regulation is examined in the broad context of the feder-
al-state balance of power."e Justice Kennedy, although paying
lip service to the view of federalism that contemplates enforce-
ment through the political process, 166 asserted that the Court
actively had defined the federal-state boundary in the past and
should, in limited situations, continue to do so.'67
Justice Kennedy recognized that any activity in the modern
world arguably "has an ultimate commercial origin or conse-
quence."" Despite this, however, Justice Kennedy accepted
Chief Justice Rehnquist's assessment that section 922(q) sought
to regulate a noncommercial activity without any evident com-
mercial purpose.'69 Or, at least, he concurred that the statute
reached into an area not previously recognized as within com-
merce power limits. Any congressional attempt to extend the
boundaries of the Commerce Clause into areas so tenuously
connected to commerce, Justice Kennedy opined, demanded
judicial scrutiny of its implications on the balance of federal and
state power. 76 Having concluded that affirming section
922(q) would represent an expansion of the recognized commerce
power, Justice Kennedy asked whether this "exercise of national
power s[ought] to intrude upon an area of traditional state con-
cern."' 7' Having found that it did so intrude, his inquiry con-
tinued.' The structure of his analysis suggested that such a
finding, rather than being dispositive of the issue, triggered
heightened scrutiny. In scrutinizing the regulation, Justice
Kennedy concluded that a single national (federal) solution was
not necessary to achieve the goals of the regulation. 74 Most
states had already addressed the problem, noted Justice Kenne-
165. See id. at 575-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring); McAllister, supra note 99, at 238-
39.
166. See Lopez, 514 U.S.. at 576-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
167. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
169. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
170. See id. at 580-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
172. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
173. See id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In these circumstances, we have a
particular duty to ensure that the federal-state balance is not destroyed.").
174. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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dy, and federal regulation would effectively "forecloseD the
States from experimenting and exercising their own judgment in
an area to which States lay claim by right of history and exper-
tise."'75 Like Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy deter-
mined that section 922(q)'s extension of commerce power so
upset the federal-state balance of power that, absent a stronger,
or more evident connection with interstate commerce, the stat-
ute must fall.'76
Lopez Analyzed
Commentators
Commentators have characterized Lopez as everything from a
"revolutionary and long overdue revival" of judicially enforced
limits on federal government 77 to a "mundane disagreement
over the application of a long-settled test."78 Any view that
characterizes Lopez as radically reversing commerce power ex-
pansion is not reconciled easily with Chief Justice Rehnquist's
contention that his opinion followed relevant precedent. 79 With
a few exceptions, most scholars have at least recognized the possi-
bility, if not actually asserted, that the Lopez decision may not
signal a dramatic shift in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.'
Most commentators and courts, however, tend to agree that
Lopez stands for an unwillingness to let the trend of commerce
power expansion continue unbridled.'' Professor Pannier iden-
175. Id. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
176. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
177. Calabresi, supra note 97, at 752.
178. Powell, supra note 160, at 651.
179. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551-68 (reciting the relevant case law and placing his
opinion within that context without purporting to overrule precedent).
180. See, e.g., McAllister, supra note 99, at 220 ("[Many, if not most, activities ...
are unaffected by the Court's decision. Thus, the true impact of Lopez is not practi-
cal."); Pannier, supra note 125, at 118 (lamenting that Lopez will not advance the
return to a federalist nation very far); Arkin, supra note 14, at 1596 ("[Ilt is certain-
ly possible that the shift will not be as dramatic as many may hope.").
181. See, e.g., United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997, 998 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, No.
96-1759, 1997 WL 250452, at *1 (Oct. 6, 1997) ("[Ihe Supreme Court intended to
establish an outer limit to congressional authority, not to retreat from well-estab-
lished Commerce Clause precedent."); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1414 n.35
(N.D. Iowa 1997) (stating that Lopez "made a renewed search for the 'outer limits' of
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tified six possible interpretations of the Lopez decision.'82 One,
Lopez indicates that the proper congressional exercise of com-
merce power should include a jurisdictional hook whereby each
application of the regulation will require a connection to inter-
state commerce." Two, Congress can ensure the constitution-
ality of an exercise of commerce power by including legislative
findings that describe the regulatory nexus with interstate com-
merce."' Three, commerce power is restricted to regulation of
activities that are commercial in the "ordinary sense" of the
meaning." s Four, the Darby method of legislation is unconsti-
tutional." Under the Darby method of legislation, congressio-
nal regulation of intrastate activities is justified on the grounds
that such regulation is necessary and proper to give effect to
another statute that directly regulates interstate commerce.'87
Five, Congress may regulate intrastate activity as a "necessary
and proper" means to effect an interstate purpose, but such
regulation is limited when the subject of such regulation is not
"commercial."' The final interpretation is similar to the fifth,
except that special limitations apply when the regulation impos-
es on an area of traditional state regulation.'89 Professor Pan-
nier admits uncertainty regarding which, if any, of the interpre-
tive limitations on the Commerce Clause courts will impose in
the name of Lopez. 9' In all likelihood, elements of all, or at
least a combination of, these interpretations will impact the
courts and legislature.
Since Lopez, numerous criminal defendants have challenged
the constitutionality of various federal criminal statutes on Corn-
Commerce Clause power"); Johnson, supra note 9, at 47 (noting that the Court in
Lopez was "refusing to expand the breadth of the Commerce Clause beyond prior
decisions"); McJohn, supra note 9, at 1 (asserting that Lopez "breaks a long line of
cases deferring to congressional action").
182. See Pannier, supra note 125, at 95-100.
183. See id. at 95.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 95-96.
186. See id. at 97-98; see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1994) (deter-
mining Congress's constitutional power under the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act).
187. See Pannier, supra note 125, at 97-98.
188. See id. at 98.
189. See id. at 99-100.
190. See id. at 118 (noting the uncertainty as to what interpretation will prevail).
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merce Clause grounds.1 9' Most courts, however, have declined
to extend Lopez beyond its narrow application to section
922(q).192 Not without difficulty, lower courts have endeavored
to extract a test from the Lopez opinion often noting that the
Court left several questions unanswered.193 Although analysis
of the lower courts' interpretations and applications of Lopez is
outside the scope of this Note, most courts have applied Lopez
conservatively-many emphasizing its retention of the rational
basis test.'
Importing the Tenth Amendment
The most insightful comments on Lopez recognize that the
opinion imported Tenth Amendment federalism questions into
the Commerce Clause analysis and that, in doing so, the Court
expressed the underlying inconsistencies in its competing feder-
alism philosophies.'95 Chief Justice Rehnquist tested the valid-
ity of commerce power based on its consequences to the balance
of federal-state power.196 Similarly, Justice Kennedy's concur-
rence, instead of dwelling on the formalistic Commerce Clause
test, plunged into a functional-federalism analysis after deter-
mining that the suggested formal interstate commerce nexus for
191. See United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1447 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 690 (1997).
192. See id. at 1447-49.
193. See, e.g., id. at 1460 (asking whether "[iun order to be constitutional . . . a
statute [must] satisfy all three sub-parts of this test"); Anisimov v. S. Lake D.D.S.,
1997 WL 538718, *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 1997) (stating that "there are several ques-
tions that appear to be left unanswered").
194. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1210 (5th Cir. 1997) (stat-
ing that "nothing in Lopez suggests that the Supreme Court has replaced the ratio-
nal basis test with a more exacting standard"); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d
569, 577-78 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 U.S. 688 (1995) (noting that Chief Justice
Rehnquist confirmed the rational basis test in Lopez); United States v. Nichols, 928
F. Supp. 302, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that Lopez asserted that the reviewing
court's role was narrow and confined to the rational basis test).
195. See McAllister, supra note 99, at 228-29; McJohn, supra note 9, at 5; Arkin,
supra note 14, at 1600-02; Eric W. Hagen, Note, United States v. Lopez: Artificial
Respiration for the Tenth Amendment, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1363 (1996).
196. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563-64 (1995) (suggesting that the
government's argument proves too much in that it would permit intrusions in areas
where states traditionally have been sovereign).
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section 922(q) was weak.197 Both Justice Kennedy and Chief
Justice Rehnquist recognized that a commerce power without
limits was blatantly inconsistent with the allocation of federal
and state power articulated in the Tenth Amendment.198 Both
Justices also recognized that Commerce Clause jurisprudence
had come to articulate a nexus test that was, in effect, all en-
compassing.'99 In a reconciliatory effort to impose a limit on
commerce power while respecting stare decisis, the Justices
imported a federalism analysis."' By judicially enforcing the
Tenth Amendment through the use of the traditional state func-
tion analysis, however, the Court's reasoning ran counter to the
Garcia decision.20 ' In limiting the commerce power through a
federalism analysis, the Court enforced substantive limits on
federal power in the name of the Tenth Amendment. Such an
enforcement is contrary to the federalism jurisprudence that
advocates procedural or politically imposed limits on federal
power.20 2
197. See supra notes 165-76 and accompanying text.
198. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68 (noting that to uphold the statute would be to
obliterate commerce power limits and thus "there never [would] be a distinction be-
tween what is truly national and what is truly local"); id. at 568-83 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (describing the federal-state balance and suggesting that a limitless com-
merce power would contradict the Framers' federalist dictate).
199. See Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Com-
merce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 719, 748 (1996) (noting that pre-Lopez Commerce
Clause doctrines "provid[ed] Congress with legislative authority for every need");
Pannier, supra note 125, at 81 (concluding that the pre-Lopez interpretation of the
Commerce Clause granted Congress general welfare powers).
200. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-69 (suggesting that to uphold the statute would
violate the Tenth Amendments dictate in that it "would require us to conclude that
the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not enumer-
ated"); id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the statute upsets the feder-
al-state balance).
201. See Arkin, supra note 14, at 1601.
202. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). But see
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Garcia did not suggest that the
judiciary lacked the power to enforce the federal-state balance indirectly through a
determination that a federal regulation fell outside the enumerated commerce power.
See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528. If Congress passed a law pursuant to the commerce
power, and the newly enacted law had no cognizable interstate commerce nexus,
then a court could strike down the law. The questioned judicial enforcement occurs
when a court determines that some activity, for no reason other than that it is tra-
ditionally performed by the states, or that it destroys the balance of federalism, is
outside the purview of federal legislation-even if Congress acted pursuant to an
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Resolving all the intellectual inconsistencies in federalism and
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, however, is not necessary to
unveil the commerce power test put forth in the Lopez decision.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion suggests a test that Justice
Kennedy's concurrence further articulates.
The Lopez Test Exposed
Despite employing traditional language, Chief Justice
Rehnquist did not state explicitly that section 922(q) regulated
an area that could not substantially affect interstate commerce.
Instead he found that: One, the statute had nothing to do with
commerce or regulation of an economic activity;0 3 two, the
statute had no jurisdictional hook;20 4 three, the statute was un-
accompanied by legislative findings;2 5 and four, the statute, if
affirmed, would upset the federal-state balance of power.2 6 Af-
ter describing the nexus proposed by the state,0 7 the Chief
Justice never addressed or attacked the direct logic behind its
nexus.2 18 Instead, he argued that accepting the government's
argument would destroy the constitutionally contemplated feder-
al-state balance.0 9 Professor Powell appropriately termed this
"the test of consequences."210
Of the four factors that the Chief Justice applied to conclude
that section 922(q) was an unconstitutional exercise of commerce
otherwise cognizable enumerated federal power. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557 (explain-
ing that the political process is suited adequately to delineate the federal-state bal-
ance of power).
203. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61.
204. See id. at 561.
205. See id. at 562-64.
206. See id. at 564-68; United States v. Miles, 122 F.3d 235, 250 (5th Cir. 1997)
(extracting from Lopez the principle that extensions of commerce power must be
scrutinized for their impact on federalism); McJohn, supra note 9, at 27, 29.
207. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64.
208. See id.
209. See id.; United States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (not-
ing that it was "in . . . refuting the government's argumentation that the majority
reveal[ed] its underlying constitutional justification for striking down [section
922(q)]"). The district court thus indicated that the Lopez majority's underlying con-
stitutional justification was that the government's theory had to be flawed because
under its theory the federal government's power would become unlimited.
210. Powell, supra note 160, at 656.
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power, three of them qualify as logical subcomponents to the
broader question of whether the statute regulates an activity
that substantially effects interstate commerce. If, for instance,
the regulated activity itself is economic or commercial, then the
statute's nexus with interstate commerce is probably apparent to
the naked eye. Additionally, should the statute include an effec-
tive jurisdictional hook, then the hook may insure that the stat-
ute applies only when the regulated activity actually effects in-
terstate commerce. Finally, if Congress supports the statute
with legislative findings identifying the nexus with interstate
commerce then, although the court will still conduct an indepen-
dent inquiry, its job is easier. In contrast, however, the final fac-
tor does not assist in evaluating the nexus with interstate com-
merce and is not a subcomponent of that over-arching question.
Investigating the statute's federalism consequences does not
fall under the umbrella of evaluating the statute's interstate
commerce nexus. This broad inquiry into federalism is the Lopez
opinion's most significant, if overlooked, contribution to the
Commerce Clause test. For Chief Justice Rehnquist, structural
federalism implications appeared to be as important to his con-
clusion as any of the applications of the subcomponents to the
traditional nexus test. 1' Sustaining this regulation, the Chief
Justice reasoned, would pave the way for unlimited commerce
power, a consequence blatantly inconsistent with the Tenth
Amendment's dictate.212
Chief Justice Rehnquist's Lopez analysis reflects the Court's
newfound willingness to add factors to the Commerce Clause
analysis when deciding a difficult case. He recognized that previ-
ous Commerce Clause cases had so emasculated the formal com-
merce power test that it easily could be stretched to incorporate
the expansion argued for in Lopez.21 In order to slow-or
211. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
212. See i&. The Chief Justice fails to recognize what should be a very effective
limit on commerce power expansion-the political system. Simply because a courtes
decision could permit unlimited expansion of federal power does not mean that Con-
gress will exercise such power. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528, 551-54 (1985). The Chief Justice's opinion is yet another example of this
Court's willingness to ignore, without overruling, the Garcia mandate. See notes 131-
39 and accompanying text.
213. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68 ("Admittedly, some of our prior cases have tak-
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end-the expansion of commerce power, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's analysis abandoned the strict confines of the weak-
ened traditional test. The traditional Commerce Clause machin-
ery adequately can evaluate most extensions of commerce power.
Section 922(q), however, challenged the logic of the traditionally
employed Commerce Clause machinery. In an effort to better
evaluate section 922(q), that is, to find a way to weed out section
922(q), Chief Justice Rehnquist applied the old machinery, but
in doing so he also broadened the inquiry. Ultimately, the Lopez
test permits a broad examination, including an examination of
the role of the statute in the context of the federal-state balance
of power.214 Chief Justice Rehnquist's concession that the tradi-
tional nexus test excludes little regulation215 reveals that his
addition is less drastic than it may appear. The Court's opinion
reflects a willingness to evaluate a statute's utility and relation-
ship to the entire government structure.
Professor Kathleen Sullivan has shown that the separation-of-
powers functionalist and formalist theories can also competently
describe competing approaches to maintaining the federal-state
balance of power. 16 She applied the formalist/functional theo-
ries to what she referred to as horizontal separation of pow-
21721
ers and vertical separation of powers. 15 Professor Sullivan
stated that "[flunctional approaches.., tend to be pragmatic
and evolutionary in method, and.., rest on a theory of balance
of powers rather than strict separation. They permit structural
innovations that are substantively consistent with the efficiency
and antityranny rationales for the separation of [both horizontal
and vertical] powers."2 9 Because Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion focused on the destructive impact that sustaining the
law would have on the federal-state balance of power, the opin-
en long steps down that road, giving great deference to congressional action ....
The broad language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional ex-
pansion.").
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 109 HARv. L. REV. 78, 91-97 (1995).
217. See id. at 92.
218. See id. at 95.
219. Id. at 93.
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ion embraces-or at least approaches-a functionalist model of
enforcing federalism.
If the majority opinion invited a more functionalist approach,
Justice Kennedy's concurrence responded to that invitation and
proposed a more detailed test.y° Under Justice Kennedy's
analysis, if the regulated activity was commercial in character
and had a strong nexus with interstate commerce, then the
Court would presume that the regulation fell within the com-
merce power.2 ' Absent an "evident nexus," Justice Kennedy
asked whether the regulation intruded on "an area of traditional
state concern." '222
Because the regulation lacked an evident interstate commerce
nexus and also intruded on an area of traditional state concern,
Justice Kennedy considered whether the regulation interfered
with the principles of federalism envisioned by the Framers.Y
In this analysis, Justice Kennedy queried whether there is one
indisputably best approach to the problem.2" As part of this
question, Justice Kennedy recognized that the statute may fore-
close the states from "perform[ing] their role as laboratories for
experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solu-
tion is far from clear."2" The concurrence also considered
whether states, independently, had addressed adequately the
subject of the federal regulation.2 '
Justice Kennedy's analysis isolated one, of several, recognized
values of the federalist system-the states as "social laborato-
220. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
221. See id at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy noted that this stat-
ute did not regulate an activity with a commercial character nor did it have an "evi-
dent commercial nexus." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy recognized
that almost any activity could be connected with commerce, but he noted that any
such far-fetched connection deserved additional inquiry. See idi (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring).
222. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring); see McAllister, supra note 99, at 239.
223. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
224. See ic at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that "considerable disagree-
ment exists about how best to accomplish" the reasonable goal of keeping guns out
of schools).
225. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Using the states as social laboratories is recog-
nized as one of the very important benefits of the federalist system. See New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
226. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581-82 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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ries" principle."' When areas of regulation are left to the
states, the argument suggests, the states, through experimenta-
tion, craft the regulations most amenable to their specific cir-
cumstances.22 8 Ultimately, the theory holds, with states across
the nation engaged in experimentation, the nation as a whole
can more effectively resolve its problems. Because the regulation
at hand frustrated this important purpose of federalism, Justice
Kennedy concluded that "[aibsent a stronger connection or iden-
tification with commercial concerns that are central to the Com-
merce Clause, that interference contradicts the federal balance
the Framers designed and that this Court is obliged to en-
force."229 Justice Kennedy, like Chief Justice Rehnquist, aban-
dons exhaustive scrutiny of the "substantially effects interstate
commerce" nexus, in favor of analyzing the statute's potential
impact on the federalist system as envisioned by the Framers.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence indicates that whenever sustain-
ing a statute would, in the Court's opinion, frustrate some im-
portant value of the federalist system, then the statute should
fall." ° 'This approach is consistent with Professor Sullivan's
vertical separation-of-powers functionalism."'
The Lopez opinion recognized that Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence effectively relaxed the commerce power test to a level of
all-inclusiveness.232 The majority opinion also reflects conflict-
ing desires to both respect stare decisis, 3 but also limit fur-
227. See New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see infra note
260 and accompanying text.
228. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581-82 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1973)); New State Ice, 285 U.S.
at 311 (Brandeis, J. dissenting); infra note 260 and accompanying text.
229. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
230. See id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
231. See Sullivan, supra note 216, at 91-97. See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT &
THOMAS D. ROWE, JR., CONSTrTUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 137
(1993) (explaining that the functionalist separation-of-powers approach asks "whether
present practices undermine constitutional commitments that should be regarded as
central" (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV
L. REV. 421, 495 (1987))).
232. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (admitting that prior case law commanded great
deference to congressional action and actually suggested the possibility of increased
expansion).
233. See id. at 553-68 (placing the Court's decision in the context of prior case law
without suggesting any overruling).
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ther expansion of the Commerce Clause.
Lopez suggests that the Commerce Clause test need not be
strictly confined to the traditional nexus. When a regulation
proves difficult to evaluate with the traditional commerce power
tests-or, in the opinion's parlance, when the connection to in-
terstate commerce is not apparent to the "naked eye"--the
court may broaden the scope of its inquiry to evaluate the regu-
lation. If the statute's nexus with interstate commerce is not
apparent to the naked eye after considering the economic nature
of the activity regulated, any legislative findings, and any possi-
ble jurisdictional hook, then Lopez endorses further analysis
under the "test of consequences" or Justice Kennedy's functional-
ist-federalism analysis. 5
THE LOPEZ TEST APPLIED TO THE MIGRATORY BIRD RULE
The question still remains: Are Lopez and the Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari to Leslie Salt irreconcilable? Or, in
other words: Can the MBR withstand the Lopez commerce power
analysis?
Looking for the Nexus: A More "Formalist" Inquiry
The Lopez test recognizes that the traditional threshold is
very low and ambiguous and contemplates, in difficult cases, an
additional in-depth inquiry into whether the consequence of af-
firming the regulation harms federalism. 6 Although the re-
mainder of this Note largely examines the federalism inquiry of
234. Id. at 563.
235. See id. This point follows from the Court's willingness in Lopez to pursue an
inquiry into the constitutionality of section 922, a statute with a weak interstate
nexus that did not regulate a commercial activity. This interpretation of Lopez per-
mits the Court to openly apply the traditional Commerce Clause test in a result-ori-
ented manner. When presented with a difficult exercise of commerce power, the
Court, instead of scrutinizing whether the regulation substantially effects interstate
commerce, can ask whether the regulation has a compelling purpose that is gener-
ally consistent with our governmental structure. If the answers to the Court's broad
inquiries prove reassuring, then it may approve of the regulation; if the answers to
the Court's broad inquiries are disconcerting, then it may conveniently find the nex-
us slightly lacking.
236. See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
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the Lopez test, the nexus test deserves brief attention.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's test begins by evaluating the
statute's nexus with interstate commerce. The Lopez test initial-
ly asks whether the statute regulates a commercial or economic
activity."7 The test suggests that any regulation of a commer-
cial activity will command substantial deference from the
Court.23 Section 404 of the Clean Water Act indiscriminately
bans the discharge of dredge or fill into wetlands or other waters
without a permit."9 Section 404 does not specifically define the
activity it regulates as commercial or economic in nature."0
Certainly one could argue that the activity regulated by section
404, although frequently commercial in nature, need not be
commercial; and therefore section 404 is not a regulation of a
commercial activity." 1 As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, how-
ever, almost any activity can be characterized as commercial or
economic. 2 It is certainly not beyond the realm of reason,
therefore, that filling in a wetland is as economic an activity as
growing wheat for home consumption.243 A court could reason-
ably characterize section 404 either way.
Next, the Lopez test asks whether section 404, as applied to
isolated wetlands, includes a jurisdictional hook that incorpo-
rates a case-by-case Commerce Clause analysis.' The MBR is
this jurisdictional hook. 5 Instead of indiscriminately subject-
ing all isolated wetlands to federal regulations, the MBR limits
237. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61.
238. See id. (explaining that even in cases where the nexus is weak, if the activity
is of an "economic nature," as in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Court
will sustain the exercise of commerce power).
239. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
240. See id.
241. See Holman, supra note 5, at 195 (stating in reference to the migratory bird
rule that "agency interpretation of the CWA has extended the statute to cover activi-
ties that are not commercial in nature").
242. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565 (stating that "any activity can be looked upon as
commercial").
243. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 111 (holding that growing wheat for home consump-
tion touches upon the interstate economy sufficiently to warrant commerce power
regulation).
244. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
245. The migratory bird rule is the very definition of a jurisdictional hook. It forces
the Army Corps to engage in a case-by-case analysis of each wetland to determine
whether such wetland has the characteristics to justify federal regulation.
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section 404 regulation to those wetlands, the destruction of
which, in the aggregate, effect interstate commerce based upon
migratory birds.
As a final factor to evaluate the nexus with interstate com-
merce, the Lopez test examines legislative findings. The Clean
Water Act does not include any findings of fact that support the
logic upon which the MBR is based.'
Section 404, as applied through the MBR, differs from section
922(q), thus far, in only one respect. Unlike section 922(q), sec-
tion 404, as applied through the MBR, incorporates a jurisdic-
tional hook. Due to the lack of legislative findings and the diffi-
culty a court might have characterizing the activity regulated as
commercial or economic, however, the MBR probably qualifies as
a difficult case. The MBR's nexus with interstate commerce is
not readily apparent to the naked eye. Following the Lopez test,
therefore, a court would ask whether the MBR is consistent with
the constitutionally contemplated structure of government.
Exploring the Federalism Consequences: A Functional Inquiry
Infringement on Traditional State Concern
Because the MBR "nexus test" is not visible to the naked eye,
the Lopez test asks whether section 404 of the Clean Water Act,
the regulation justified by the MBR, regulates in an area of
traditional state concern. 7 This is the first consideration in
examining the impact that sustaining the law would have on the
structure of government. Section 404, as an example of land use
control, almost unquestionably intrudes on an area traditionally
reserved to the states or their localities."8 Generally, states
and local governments dictate land-use policies for their jurisdic-
tions. 9 Section 404, therefore, infringes on territory tradition-
ally reserved to the states. In this respect the MBR and section
922(q) are the same.
246. See Holman, supra note 5, at 199.
247. See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
248. See Holman, supra note 5, at 195.
249. See Paul D. Barker, Note, The Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act: The Problems
With State Land Regulation of Interstate Resources, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 735,
739 (1990) (citing MODEL LAND DEv. CODE art. 7 commentary at 252-53 (1975)).
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Were he reviewing the MBR, Chief Justice Rehnquist's analy-
sis would proceed by asking whether sustaining the statute
would effectively obliterate the constitutionally contemplated
boundaries between federal and state sovereignty."0 To satisfy
the Chief Justice, proponents of the MBR would need to demon-
strate that the logic behind the MBR would not open the door to
a regulatory parade of horribles in which Congress could expand
the federal commerce power without limits."' Chief Justice
Rehnquist's concern would not be unfounded. The MBR advo-
cates federal regulation over wetlands on grounds that their in-
terstate commerce connection is provided by their potential use
by migratory birds that cross state lines. 2 One could inquire,
as some commentators have.. whether any and all land used,
or potentially used, by migratory birds could come under federal
regulation by virtue of the bird's interstate migration. But the
MBR does not propose that the mere potential use of any land
by migratory birds could subject that land to federal commerce
power jurisdiction. The MBR proposes that when a very special
type of land, the wetland, 4 is the habitat for a certain type of
bird, the migratory bird, that land may come under federal regu-
lation. 5 The logic of the MBR is that destruction of wetland
habitats threatens to devastate the commerce associated with
migratory birds.25 The MBR implicitly recognizes the unique
symbiotic relationship between the wetland and the migratory
bird. Because section 404 is a logical and principled extension of
250. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (striking down the
law because it "would require [the Court] to conclude . . . that there never will be a
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local").
251. See id. at 564-68 (suggesting a parade of horribles that would follow an affir-
mation of this exercise of the commerce power).
252. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
253. See Bablo, supra note 9, at 289 (stating that "[m]igratory birds land every-
where (even parking lot puddles)"); Holman, supra note 5, at 197 (stating that the
migratory bird rule 'operates as a limiter-manque-a limiting rule with no limits").
254. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. The Corps defines "wetland"
pursuant to 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1997) to include "those areas that are inundated or
saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to sup-
port, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation
typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions."
255. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
256. See id.
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the commerce power, a point elaborated further in the following
sections, its affirmation would not represent a relaxation of com-
merce power resulting in unbridled federal police power. 7 If
the Commerce Clause test consisted solely of the formal nexus
inquiry, then the Chief Justice would have a valid concern. The
Lopez test, however, includes, in addition to the formal nexus
test, a broad functionalist inquiry into the consequences of af-
firming an extension of the commerce power. Although an inaus-
picious extension of federal commerce power based on the pres-
ence of migratory birds might pass the traditional nexus test,
presumably its inauspicious character would warrant its failure
under the functional inquiry.
After satisfying the Chief Justice by demonstrating that the
MBR's extension of commerce power does not open the door to a
parade of horribles, the question remains whether the applica-
tion of the MBR alone, regardless of its precedent-setting conse-
quences, so intrudes upon state sovereignty as to unconstitution-
ally upset the federal-state balance. An analysis of the MBR in-
dicates that it does not frustrate the system of federalism con-
templated by the Constitution.
Federalism
In order to determine whether the MBR is consistent with the
federal-state balance of power, this section explores the constitu-
tionally contemplated balance of power and the reasons that jus-
tify its existence. This analysis suggests that the Framers struc-
tured the government to achieve certain benefits. As such, the
Court must enforce the structure of the government to ensure
that the nation reaps the benefits of that structure; however, the
Court should enforce the Framers' vision only insofar as it pro-
duces the Framers' contemplated benefits-or insofar as the al-
leged benefits are actually beneficial.
The constitutionally mandated system of federalism, like the
system of checks and balances between separate branches of
257. Although probably unsatisfactory to the Chief Justice, arguably, the political,
or structural, limitations on commerce power offer adequate restraints to allay fears
of the slippery slope. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985).
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government, aids in preserving individual liberties against the
tyranny of the government by diffusing governmental power on
different levels." s A number of welcome benefits flow from this
unique system of federalism. An oft-quoted statement of Justice
Brandeis reflects the aspect of federalism on which Justice Ken-
nedy focused in Lopez:259 "It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the coun-
try."260 The Tenth Amendment's deference to state sovereignty
also permits increased access to the political system for individu-
als to make policy on a local level.2"' Such policy, the argument
goes, accommodates local diversity and gives effect to the
knowledge and expertise of those most familiar with local condi-
tions.262 Moreover, some commentators have noted that the
federalist system creates a climate wherein states are encour-
aged to compete for the affections of the people.2" The values
that justify the dual system of federalism can be divided into
two categories. First are those that "maximize governmental
efficiency by placing responsibility for various matters in the
government that has the most expertise or that is in the best
position to resolve any problematic issues with the least expen-
diture of resources."2" Second are those that "maximize per-
sonal liberty by diffusing sovereign power for the protection of
individual freedom."265 With respect to governmental efficiency,
the MBR does not violate the principles behind the balance of
power between the federal and state sovereignty. The MBR,
258. See CRAIG R. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 334-35 (1992); Sullivan,
supra note 216, at 95.
259. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (citing New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting)).
260. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting); see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (stating that the feder-
alist structure "allows for more innovation and experimentation in government").
261. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State
Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 853 (1979).
262. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; Kaden, supra note 261, at 854.
263. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (stating that federalism puts "[sItates in competi-
tion for a mobile citizenry").
264. McAllister, supra note 99, at 240.
265. Id.
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rather, operates to further efficient correction of a market fail-
ure. With respect to individual freedoms, the MBR makes a con-
cession to federal tyranny over the state sovereigns. This Note
argues, however, that the states, as a collective, should have
jurisdiction to resolve problems that involve interstate
externalities.
The MBR and Federalism
The federal government is better situated to accomplish effec-
tively the goals of wetland regulation. The constitutional pre-
sumption of deference to state sovereignty, therefore, should not
apply to the regulation of isolated wetlands. The logic upon
which Congress reserved regulatory power to the states breaks
down when that regulatory power is directed towards an activi-
ty, the cost and benefits of which are not confined substantially
within the borders of individual states. 6 If an activity signifi-
cantly affects the interests of a constituency broader than a
state's population, then the state government cannot protect ef-
fectively that constituency's interests. Such is often the case
with regulation of isolated wetlands. When wetlands are de-
stroyed in one state, for example, the impact on the waterfowl
industry is felt outside the boundaries of that state.2"7 The
MBR triggers federal regulation of isolated wetlands only when
interests not represented by the solitary state government are
affected-that is, when the cost of a given wetland's destruction
falls exterior to the state in which the wetland is located. As ex-
plained below, such interstate externalities represent market
failures that demand correction. Intuitively, a political unit larg-
er than a state is better qualified to correct market failures that
arise out of interstate externalities.
266. See Calabresi, supra note 97, at 782 (asserting that interstate externalities
provide strong support for centralized government). Calabresi noted: 'The national
government can prevent serious negative externalities caused by state governmental
action by adopting policies that force the states generating those externalities to pay
for the associated costs." Id. at 783.
267. See Houck & Rolland, supra note 23, at 1248 (noting that isolated wetland
destruction in North Dakota has threatened to eliminate two species of migratory
birds in Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware).
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The Need for Land-Use Regulation
The externality, or market failure, that arises out of wetland
destruction creates the need for corrective regulation. Generally,
the government recognizes an occasional need to impose land-
use regulations upon private land owners.2" A privately-owned
wetland has value that the owner may realize through develop-
ing, and thereby destroying, that wetland. Any such wetland
also has an economic value that is shared by many more people
than its private owners-a "positive externality." 9 A wetland
may act to purify water, to prevent flooding, and to support mi-
gratory fowl that are the focus of a multimillion dollar interstate
hunting and birdwatching industry.27 These are economic val-
ues shared by the commons. When the wetland is destroyed, the
costs in water purification, flood prevention, and migratory bird
habitats are shared by the hundreds, thousands, or even mil-
lions of people affected." 1 In contrast, when a developer de-
stroys that wetland, the value created in converting that parcel
from wetland into development is not conferred upon the same
broad constituency that bore the cost of its destruction. Because
the creation of value is concentrated on the owner while the
costs are borne in part externally, the owner's economic incen-
tives point toward unbridled development at the expense of
wetland preservation. 72 At the same time, no single individual
beneficiary of the wetland's "positive externality" has enough
stake in the wetlands' existence to advocate for its preserva-
tion.273 In order to protect resources of the commons, therefore,
268. See Lynda L. Butler, Private Land Use, Changing Public Values, and Notions
of Relativity, 1992 BYU L. REV. 629, 650-51, 656.
269. See Houck & Rolland, supra note 23, at 1244-52.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See Butler, supra note 268, at 650.
Unless private landowners are forced to consider the third party costs of
their land use decisions, the landowners have no incentive to protect
common resources affected by their uses .... [Individual users of com-
mon resources will not exercise self-restraint to restrict their own use if
others do not take similar action; nor will they voluntarily incur costs to
preserve the commons.
Id.
273. See id.
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a collective constituency must force private landowners to inter-
nalize the externalities that their land use practices cause. 4
One method of internalizing economic externalities is through
regulation designed to correct the market's failure. 5 The MBR
is one way of identifying wetlands whose destruction would
impose external costs. Section 404 authorizes a representative of
the affected constituency, the federal government, to balance the
costs and benefits of the wetlands destruction. In this sense, it
forces the landowner to consider the external costs of wetland
destruction, or put differently, it forces the landowner to inter-
nalize that cost.
76
The Need for Federal Land-Use Regulation
Establishing the need for land-use regulations to internalize
the external costs of the land-use practices does not explain why
these regulations should originate from the federal, rather than
the state, government. When the costs of a land-use practice fall
external not only to the property owner, but also to the state's
boundaries, state regulation begins to look less ideal. The same
incentives for unbridled development, which create the need for
land-use regulation in the first place,277 can act as incentives
on a state government level to accommodate that unbridled
development.7 8 If the costs of wetland destruction fall external
to the state while the benefits fall within the state, then the
people of the state have little incentive to internalize those costs.
274. See id.; Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental
Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2374-75 (1996) (stating that "[t]he presence of
interstate externalities constitutes a market failure. In the absence of other market
failures or public choice problems, correcting the externality leads to the maximization
of social welfare.").
275. See STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY POLICY 7-8 (1979) (noting the use of environmental regulation to correct
spillover costs or regulations).
276. For a discussion of internalizing externalities and land use, see JESSE
DUKEhM ER & JAAIES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 49-53 (1993).
277. See Butler, supra note 268, at 650.
278. See James C. Buresh, Note, State and Federal Land Use Regulation: An Ap-
plication to Groundwater and Nonpoint Source Pollution Control, 95 YALE L.J. 1433,
1440 (1986) (noting that "[a] community may tolerate pollution-causing land uses
because of a desire to attract development, or a reluctance to regulate politically
influential land users").
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The MBR triggers federal regulation only when the wetland's
destruction would contribute to a significant cost external to the
state in which the wetland is located."
Wetland Regulation and State Sovereignty
Assuming it is desirable to correct the market failure associat-
ed with wetland destruction, the analysis now asks whether
principles of federalism militate for state jurisdiction. The com-
monly recognized benefits associated with the constitutionally
contemplated presumption of state jurisdiction over general
regulatory matters do not impart cognizable benefits to wetland
regulation. This section identifies some of the recognized bene-
fits associated with the constitutional deference to state sover-
eignty and asks whether those benefits are consistent with cor-
recting the market failure associated with wetland destruction.
The economic particularities of wetland development and de-
struction render the interests sought in wetland regulation in-
consistent with the values associated with state sovereign regu-
lation. Moreover, any activity that shares these characteristics
demands federal, rather than state, attention.
Social Laboratories
The benefits associated with states acting as social laborato-
ries28° do not militate for state control over wetland destruc-
tion. First, states and local governments, having had the oppor-
tunity to experiment in the past, have failed to address the prob-
lem effectively, causing commentators to question their expertise
in this field.28' Second, allowing states the freedom to address
problems that affect constituencies outside of their jurisdiction is
counterintuitive and comes at the expense of outsiders' interests.
279. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
280. The notion of states as social laboratories comes from Justice Brandeis's dis-
sent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting). See supra notes 227-31, 260, and accompanying text.
281. See Barker, supra note 249, at 738-39 (noting the problems that have accom-
panied local land use regulation and suggesting that the same problems have bur-
dened states); Buresh, supra note 278, at 1439-40 (noting the failure of local govern-
ments to implement adequate land use regulation).
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As laboratories, the states may craft remedies that suit their
own interests, but when the problems affect the people of other
states, 2 experimentation on a state level lacks merit.
Regulatory Flexibility2"
Similarly, promoting regulatory flexibility to accommodate
local diversity frustrates the aim of wetland regulation. In decid-
ing how best to keep guns out of schools, a system that allows
localities to develop legislation that accommodates their cultural
and social idiosyncrasies is worthy of praise.2 Allowing the
same flexibility in wetland regulation, however, opens the door
to opportunism. States in which wetlands represent a significant
portion of developable land may craft regulatory programs allow-
ing the residents to profit at the expense of foreign states.'
Increased Public Participation
State regulation, in opposition to federal regulation, increases
the degree to which the individual has political access. 86 An
individual's vote has a greater impact at the state level as op-
posed to the federal level. 7 This function of state sovereignty
ceases to be a benefit when the individual votes on legislation
affecting people unrepresented in the forum. There is little merit
to increasing the individual's representation in crafting legisla-
tion unless that legislation regulates an activity whose costs and
benefits are concentrated on the voters of that political forum. In
the case of wetlands, even isolated wetlands, the costs of their
282. For examples of the transboundary effects of wetland destruction, see Houck &
Rolland, supra note 23, at 1245-50.
283. For a brief discussion regarding how decentralization creates governments
more responsive to "[1]ocal t]astes and [clonditions," see Calabresi, supra note 97, at
775.
284. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581-82 (1995).
285. States can allow their regulations to permit residents to convert wetlands into
more profitable land without internalizing the full cost of the wetland's destruction.
In this sense, then, the landowners profit at the nation's expense. Such a situation
ultimately leads to destructive development. See Butler, supra note 268, at 650 (cit-
ing Garnett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45
(1968)).
286. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
287. See id.
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degradation usually falls, in part, outside of the state in which
they exist.288 Increasing the individual's access to the state po-
litical forum, therefore, only furthers the likelihood that the
regulation will fail to take into account costs that are incurred
outside the political forum.289
Interstate Competition for Citizen Affection 9
The notion that state sovereignty fosters a healthy competi-
tion between states for the affection of the nation's citizens does
not support the assertion that state regulation of wetlands
would encourage the evolution of a better regulatory system.
Rather, one could expect a regulatory "race to the bottom"
whereby states might compete to attract business development
interests by deregulating wetland development."' States at-
tempting to attract developers might create an environment
wherein developers could retain all of the benefits of wetland
development while placing the costs of wetland destruction on
others. 92
Federalism Summary
Federalism dictates leaving to the states the routine powers
of regulation.9 Federalism, however, should extend only as
far as the logic that justifies its existence. The benefits of state
regulation are absent when the activity regulated involves costs
288. See Houck & Rolland, supra note 23, at 1248 (describing the transboundary
nature of wetlands).
289. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) suggests that smaller political en-
tities are more apt to fall prey to interest group's influence.
290. For a brief discussion of the value in state competition that flows from decen-
tralization, see Calabresi, supra note 97, at 776.
291. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J.
1196, 1212 (1977); Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Qua.
si-Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons
from the Clean Air Act, 62 IowA L. REv. 713, 747 (1977). But see Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale
for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1211 (1992)
("challeng[ing] the accepted wisdom on the race to the bottom").
292. See supra note 291.
293. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
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imposed outside of the state. Many of the values of natural re-
sources like wetlands are values shared by the commons.2"
The many benefits associated with leaving regulation to the
states frustrate the aim of effective wetland regulation. Wetland
regulation is an effort to balance the interests of society against
the interest of the individual property owner. Government can-
not achieve such a balance of interests absent the representation
of all of those interested. In the interest of efficient government,
then, the states, as a collective, should have jurisdiction to regu-
late matters that defy resolution by individual state sovereigns.
Admittedly, this power represents a minor concession to federal
tyranny over the states, but because it is a concession based on
sound principles, it does not represent a significant threat to the
general rule that routine regulatory matters are reserved to the
states.
An Answer To The Lopez Test's Final Question
This analysis demonstrates that effective wetland regulation
depends upon balancing the wetland-destruction-interest of the
individual owner against the wetland-preservation-interest of
society; and further suggests that this regulation, for principled
reasons, is best achieved on a federal level. Having recognized the
need for land-use regulation to balance the property interests of
the individual wetland owner against the preservation interest
society has in wetlands,295 the conclusion that the federal gov-
erment is in a better position to effectively legislate in this area
is inescapable. Unlike legislating to prevent guns in schools,296
wetland regulation does call for a single national solution.
The foregoing federalism analysis has argued that the benefits
that flow from state, rather than federal, regulation, actually
run counter to the needs of effective wetland regulation.29
Whatever "benefits" state sovereignty could offer in the realm of
protecting personal liberty would frustrate the proper balancing
of national versus private property owners' interests. Protection
294. See Houck & Rolland, supra note 23, at 1248.
295. See supra notes 268-79 and accompanying text.
296. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
297. See supra notes 266-92 and accompanying text.
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of property owners' interests against tyranny of the govern-
ment298 would come at the expense of the interests of those nu-
merous individuals who bear the cost of the property owners'
land-use practices. Because courts should respect and extend the
general deference to state sovereignty only so far as the reasons
that justify its existence, the courts should permit federal juris-
diction over wetlands. Moreover, because this extension of com-
merce power is a principled one, allowing the extension should
not open the door to a parade of unjustified extensions. Rather,
it should have the desirable consequence of opening the door to
federal regulation of similar activities that create interstate
externalities. The forgoing analysis answers the Lopez test's last
question, as applied to the MBR, in the negative-that is, this
regulation does not unduly upset the federal-state balance nor
does it fail the "test of consequences." Or, to draw on the struc-
tural or functionalist arguments of separation-of-powers analy-
sis, federal regulation of wetland destruction does not "under-
mine [a] constitutional commitmento that should be regarded as
central."299
Reconciling Lopez and Leslie Salt
Given this analysis, the denial of certiorari to Leslie Salt and
Lopez are reconcilable. Although it is not apparent to the naked
eye that the MBR has a nexus with interstate commerce, the
functional-federalism analysis should persuade the Court to up-
hold the MBR as a valid exercise of commerce power."' Unlike
section 922(q), the MBR does not undermine the constitutionally
contemplated structure of federalism.
Finally, opening the door to federal regulation of wetlands
does not open the door to unlimited federal regulation as warned
against in Lopez."0' For example, it would not open the door to
298. See DUCAT, supra note 258, at 334-35.
299. GERHARDT & ROWE, supra note 231, at 137 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 495 (1987)). The point
here is that the MBR does not make inroads on constitutionally protected rights
that the people of the states can rightfully claim. State sovereignty does not exist to
allow individuals to profit at the nation's expense.
300. See supra notes 247-99 and accompanying text.
301. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
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regulations like section 922(q). At most, affirming federal regula-
tion of isolated wetlands creates an exception. °2 in areas of tra-
ditional state regulation when the regulated activity imposes
substantial extra-statal costs. Creating this "exception" does not
mean that these areas inevitably are destined for federal
micromanagement. This "exception" simply expands the concep-
tual area in which the Court will defer to a congressional deci-
sion to legislate in the name of the commerce power. All of the
political process limitations on congressional power continue to
apply.30
3
Over the years, the Court has allowed expansion of commerce
power to outgrow the literal language of the Commerce Clause.
In the process, the Court crafted lenient tests defining commerce
power to accommodate the regulatory needs of the complex,
technologically advanced commercial world. The Court in Lopez
added to that test. In Lopez, the Court examined the exercise of
commerce power in the broad context of the constitutionally con-
templated structure of government-an inquiry that reflects a
functional approach. Courts should take advantage of the Lopez
invitation to evaluate extensions of commerce power based on
their practical effects. This Note suggests that regulation of ac-
tivities that create interstate externalities qualify under Lopez
for federal commerce power jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The MBR represents a valid expression of congressional com-
merce power even after the Lopez decision. Contrary to Justice
Thomas's dissent, the Court's decision to deny certiorari to Leslie
Salt is reconcilable with Lopez. Applying the Lopez analysis to
the MBR does not entail exclusive and intensive scrutiny to the
law's nexus with interstate commerce. Even if the nexus is
weak, the Lopez decision, especially Justice Kennedy's concur-
302. "Exception" may not be the correct word. It is actually just the outcome
reached by applying the test and determining that the MBR falls on the "permissi-
ble federal regulation" side.
303. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551-52 (1985)
(explaining that the Framers intended the structure of the government to create po-
litical limits on federal power over the states).
1998] 1739
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1695
rence, mandates a pragmatic, or functionalist approach investi-
gating the federalism consequences of sustaining the legislation
in question. Having recognized the nearly all-inclusive flexibility
of the traditional interstate commerce nexus requirement, the
majority opinion suggests that the findings of the Court's func-
tional-federalism analysis is just as important to the outcome of
the case. The functional-federalism analysis reveals that effec-
tive land-use regulation of resources whose destruction imposes
costs not only external to the landowner, but external to the
state, can only emanate from the federal government. Federal
land-use regulation involves balancing the interests of all those
affected by the land-use practice against the interests of the pri-
vate land owner. An honest balancing cannot occur absent the
representation of all those interested. In other words, a regula-
tion that aims to correct a market failure arising out of an inter-
state externality is best crafted by the United States rather than
states acting individually.
The MBR acts, as one among several mechanisms, to ensure
that the federal government will impose section 404 jurisdiction
over only wetlands, the destruction of which, in the aggregate,
will impose a substantial cost on the nation. Sustaining the
MBR does not undermine, in a meaningful way, any of the con-
templated benefits of state sovereignty. The MBR does not frus-
trate the constitutionally mandated federal-state balance in that
it does not open the door to limitless federal regulation. Whatev-
er its merits, judicially imposed deference to state sovereignty
should extend only so far as the reasons that justify state sover-
eignty as a principle.
Peter Arey Gilbert
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